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COMMUNIST CONTROLS ON RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

TESTIMONY OF PETR S. DERIABIAN

MAY 5, 1959

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RESOLUTION

MAY 12, 1959.

Resolved by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, That the testimony of Petr S. Deriabian given in executive session on May 5, 1959, is hereby released to be printed as part of the public hearing record of the subcommittee.

JAMES O. EASTLAND, *Chairman.*
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Dated : May 13, 1959.

III

COMMUNIST CONTROLS ON RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES

TUESDAY, MAY 5, 1959

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION,
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:05 p.m., in room 141, Senate Office Building, Senator Thomas J. Dodd presiding.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; Frank W. Schroeder, chief investigator; Robert C. McManus, investigation analyst; and William F. McManus, research assistant.

Senator Dodd. The subcommittee will come to order.

We will first swear the witness. Will you stand and raise your right hand, please.

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. DERIABIAN. I do.

Senator Dodd. Will you give us your name and address?

TESTIMONY OF PETR S. DERIABIAN, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. DERIABIAN. My name is Petr S. Deriabian. I live now in Washington, D. C.

I was born February 13, 1921, in Russia, in the village of Lokot, in Altai, Kray Province. Its name then was Altai. It is now Altai Kray.

Senator Dodd. You may proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Deriabian, have you been an officer of the NKVD, later known as the Ministry of State Security?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Yes. I was a member of the state security from 1944 until February 1954.

Mr. SOURWINE. What rank did you reach in that organization?

Mr. DERIABIAN. The last of my rank was major of state security.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you describe briefly your career with that organization?

Mr. DERIABIAN. I attended a counterintelligence school in 1944-45 in Moscow. At that time it was under state security control.

After finishing that school, I was working as a case officer in the "operupolnomocheny"; in the naval counterintelligence.

Then I was since 1945 to 1946, I was the chief of the Komsomol, Communist youth organization of the naval counterintelligence directorate, in Moscow.

And in May 1946, I left Moscow and went to my place where I was born in Altai Province. I was working there in the state security organization of Altai Kray from May 1946 to February 1947.

First I was a chief of surveillance group and then chief of administration of the Province headquarters of the state security in the city of Barnaul, capital of Altai Province.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, go ahead.

Mr. DERIABIAN. And in March 1947, I was called to Moscow where I started to work in the counterintelligence section of Otkrana, the Kremlin security guard, which is taking care of members of the Politbureau.

I was working there from March 1947 until April 1952.

Then I was transferred to the intelligence directorate, actually as an officer of the Austro-German section, where I was working as deputy chief of the German sector.

In September 1953, I was transferred to Vienna, to MVD headquarters in Vienna, in Austria. There I was working as counterintelligence officer. And I left MVD in February 1954. That is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Deriabian, while you were in Barnaul, did you have occasion to learn of action by the MGB against believers of Orthodox church and Baptists and Seventh Day Adventists?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Yes, while I was working in Barnaul in 1946-47, I was working as chief administrative officer under Colonel Ruzin, who was the chief of state security at that time.

At that time in my position I read all papers which was coming into security from Moscow and other Provinces, and outgoing from there. It was my business at that time.

In that time, in 1946 and 1947, in Barnaul, in the state security, we had a subsection O which was taking care of religious activities in Altai Kray. The chief of that subsection at that time was Captain Gavrilov, who was working under Colonel Ruzin, too.

In MGB in Moscow, at that time, there was a section O of the state security. The chief of that section was General Karpov, and under him was every security officer in the region and the Province sections, or subsections O.

This subsection was taking care of all activities of Baptists and religious orders.

In that time in Altai Kray, when I was working there in 1946 and 1947, according to the liberalization, which was 1943, during the war when freedom for religious activity, even in the Soviet Union, was had, the activists in Altai Province of the Communist Party organization was wondering about that, and captain Gavrilov at that time issued a report to Colonel Ruzin, describing all religious activities in Altai Kray.

At that time, the head of the party in Altai Kray, Belayev, who was later a member of the Presidium to the Communist Party—Mr. Belayev had given instructions to Colonel Ruzin to investigate all religious activities and give a full report to the Communist Party bureau in Altai Kray. And Captain Gavrilov issued, recommended countermeasures. Colonel Ruzin was a member of the Altai Kray party committee in Altai Province.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see this report?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Yes, I saw this report, I read that report. Actually I was reading it together with Colonel Ruzin. And there were others who were working for me in my office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us about this report?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That report describes all religious activities in the towns. One town was Kamen town, which was approximately 850 kilometers from Barnaul. It is a small town. That report described the activities of the Orthodox and the Baptists. Old believers' activities there, besides their actions, in the report looked not like a religious activity, but more anti-Soviet.

They had opened the places of worship where the religious people went to read the Bible and so on and so on. There were a few churches opened in that small town.

In the same way, Captain Gavrilov found that some old believers had harbored a deserter. He came in sometime during the war and was there, and the believers did not show him to the government, the local people. And Captain Gavrilov suggested that they had found the soldier, and it was possible to say that all of the believers are anti-Soviet and to take action. That is, to take some kind of prophylactic, or preventive, action.

And in the Altai Kray party committee, after reading these reports—actually Colonel Ruzin delivered that report to the party committee and made that decision, that Colonel Ruzin, as chief of the state security in Barnaul, should take some action as to the religious activities in Altai Kray.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, Captain Gavrilov recommended counteraction against the religions?

Mr. DERIABIAN. You are right; that is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And it was then decided that such countermeasures were to be taken?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us when this was—this was in the year 1943, was it, or 1944?

Mr. DERIABIAN. No, no; it was 1946.

Mr. SOURWINE. 1946?

Mr. DERIABIAN. December 1946.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was the nature of the countermeasures that were decided upon?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Well, actually, the committee of Altai Kray region, they did not suggest what kind of measures should be taken, because they do not work this way. They never say how to do, what kind of measures.

Colonel Ruzin was a member of the party committee. He himself made the decision. Captain Gavrilov made a plan, and the Provincial committee approved the adoption of countermeasures.

It encompassed party activists and the Komsomol, and it made a nice operation. And it was to investigate the religious activists, to investigate them.

Mr. SOURWINE. By "activists of religion" you mean religious leaders?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Leaders; that is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. The priests and the ministers?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Well, actually I would say it isn't possible to call them priests or ministers. Some of them who were strong believers, the people appointed themselves to be religious priests or to substitute for the priests.

Mr. SOURWINE. The lay leaders of the church, as we would say?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right. The Baptist and all believer organizations, they did not meet in churches, but in some kind of a house, and sometimes met together and read the Bible, like that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say that some of these people were arrested?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Actually, they arrested about 16 leaders and activists who were strong believers and brought them to Barnaul City. They decided to put them into the jail that we now had at headquarters, but that jail was too little. And the chief of the militia said we could use his militia jail to put these people under investigation.

Mr. SOURWINE. So they were put in the military prison?

Mr. DERIABIAN. No, the militia.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the police jail?

Mr. DERIABIAN. The police jail. Some of them stayed in the other, but there was not enough place, and the others they put in the police jail.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would be the common jail of the town, would you say?

Mr. DERIABIAN. No, I would say, actually it is a house of detention. People are put there while being investigated, but as a matter of fact, some of them stayed there for 4 years.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think, perhaps, the record should show at this time—correct me if I am wrong—that quite contrary to our system in this country, under the Soviet system when a man is arrested he is immediately put into detention; he is under the control of the prosecutor; he is not entitled to an attorney until the investigation is finished, and he may be detained for a substantial period of time.

Mr. DERIABIAN. In this case, I would like to describe to you that, because the prosecutor generally was a member of the committee of Barnaul, too. They worked together. He signed that paper to arrest and what should be done, because if he will not, it means he is not making order out of the party committee order. It was actually sometimes possible to see the prisoners, but it was his duty.

And it was so that you could say, "Let us look around and save some work."

Mr. SOURWINE. In this country we have pretrial procedure which is before the court, and the accused has all the protections of the law.

In the Soviet Union the pretrial procedure is under the police. It is under the control of the prosecutor, and the accused has no protection and no rights at all.

Mr. DERIABIAN. You are right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Until the investigation is completed.

Mr. DERIABIAN. You are right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. DERIABIAN. Now, from these 16 believers who were arrested at that time, some of them were sentenced from 5, 7, and 8 years in jail, and some of them—I think 3 or 4 who were very old women—they freed them.

Mr. SOURWINE. They convicted 12 or 13 out of the 16?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Out of the 16.

Mr. SOURWINE. And gave them long jail—prison sentences?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Some of them 5, 6, 7, and 8 years.

Mr. SOURWINE. What had they done for which they were punished in this way?

Mr. DERIABIAN. They were punished on anti-Soviet activities.

Mr. SOURWINE. Simply for being religious leaders?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Simply for being religious leaders, and that they made religious propaganda to the population of that city—asked them to join a religious organization or a church, while the people had to go to work, working in the collective farms, and so on, and so on.

Mr. SOURWINE. Asking people to join the church, then, was characterized as an antistate activity?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right; you are right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say this was an isolated instance in Kamen town, or was this simply a sample, illustrative of the end of that period of religious toleration which you spoke about earlier?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Pardon me, no; it was typical for the Soviet Union, not just right in Altai Kray.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was typical?

Mr. DERIABIAN. In other provinces.

Mr. SOURWINE. This just happened to be a particular instance which came to your notice?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, go ahead.

Mr. DERIABIAN. About the religious activity, I would like to state that while I was in Barnaul, late in 1946, the chief, Colonel Ruzin, received a letter from General Karpov, whom I mentioned before as chief of the religious section of the state security in Moscow, and in that letter General Karpov stated that one resident of Barnaul has sent a letter asking for admission to the Orthodox Seminary in Moscow. He asked consent to attend that.

General Karpov wrote to Colonel Ruzin to check the background of the young man. Actually at that time he was about 31 or 32 years old, and to recruit him as a source or an agent of MGB, before he could go to Moscow.

Colonel Ruzin, actually ordered to do the job, sent it to Captain Gavrilov, with instructions to check and report.

Approximately 1 month later a letter was sent to Moscow, to General Karpov, from Colonel Ruzin, and Colonel Ruzin reported that this candidate was a religious fanatic.

Mr. SOURWINE. A religious fanatic?

Mr. DERIABIAN. And that he saw no reason to recruit him as an agent, because he will not help.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before you go on, you mentioned Major General Karpov. Is this the same Major General Karpov who was described by Vladimir Petrov, the Soviet diplomat who defected in Australia, as a permanent officer of the NKVD, who over a long period had made an assiduous and exhaustive study of Russian Orthodox ceremonies, ordinances, and teachings, and was able to converse earnestly and learnedly with church dignitaries on their own ground?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Well, Major General Karpov is the same man who was the chief of the council on Orthodox Church under the Council of Ministers in the Soviet Union.

Well, I would say one thing more, that at the same time he was boss of MGB Section O, in the state security in Moscow, he also has to answer before the Central Committee of the Communist Party about all religious activities in the Soviet Union.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think the record should show at this point that this description of Major General Karpov by Petrov was corroborated by Colonel Yuri Rastvorov before this committee on April 12, 1956, in our series on "Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States," part 14, pages 780 and 781.

Now in 1947 you say you were transferred to Moscow?

Mr. DERIABIAN. In 1947 I was transferred to Moscow.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you worked there in the counter intelligence section of Okrana?

Mr. DERIABIAN. I was working under a section of the Okrana.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the Kremlin palace guard?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. For how long?

Mr. DERIABIAN. From 1947 until April 1952.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did your duties involve the investigation of candidates for membership in Okrana and a periodic check on the members of Okrana?

Mr. DERIABIAN. It was my duty—well, generally, those who went to work in Okrana, and who were already working in Okrana. We checked them about once a year. Some of them who worked to the leaders twice a year.

In this case, say, about religious, sometimes I received a letter from General Karpov's section, because somebody in his home, a child, or some wife or other person, a grandmother attended the church. Actually, all reports about religion went from General Karpov's office, his Section O. Or if they had an ikon in their home, that was sufficient.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell, Mr. Deriabian, what was the attitude of Okrana with regard to religious activities by its members or agents, was it frowned upon?

Mr. DERIABIAN. All members of Okrana at that time were members of the Communist Party or a member of Komsomol, the Communist youth organization. It is impossible—if you are not a member, you cannot work for Okrana.

Another thing, in the investigation, or through checking we found that some officers or some person who was going to work in Okrana, was religious, or his wife was religious, or they had a child, or they had ikons, they could not work for Okrana. While they stayed in Okrana if we found they had religious feelings, or something else like it, they could not stay in the Communist Party or the Komsomol, they lost their job.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, you could not have religious connections or participate in religious observances and remain a member of the Communist Party or of Okrana?

Mr. DERIABIAN. You are right. Of course, I believe some of us were believers, and so on.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean that even some of the members of Okrana had a depth of religious belief which led them to do these things which the organization prohibited?

Mr. DERABIAN. Yes. Well, actually, it was impossible—some of them believed in God, and they are religious.

Mr. SOURWINE. But if they were found out?

Mr. DERABIAN. If they are found out, fire them.

Mr. SOURWINE. What can you tell us about the ramifications of Major General Karpov's organization?

Mr. DERABIAN. Well, section O was organized April 1947. Before that it was another special religious section under the secret police. Before 1947 it was the secret police of the NKVD we called it at that time.

In 1947 it was being reorganized. And they started to call it MGB, the Ministry of State Security. And they organized a section—actually started organizing it in 1946, and actually completed it sometime in March 1947. And Major General Karpov was appointed to be the boss of that section.

This section has subsections and other sections. Each republic, for instance, has a section or a subsection. It is according to the religious activity in each republic. If there is more religious activities in some area, there are more. And each Province has General Karpov's officers in every city, where they work in KGB, taking care of all church activities or activists' work.

Most of the priests in the Soviet Union, and the religious people who help the priests, they are some kind of agents of KGB or the MGB, or were at that time.

It is impossible in the Soviet Union to serve God without serving the state security. You give some information for state security about religious activities; otherwise you cannot attend the church. Some of the priests became agents of the state security because there was nothing else for them to do.

When the state security recruited priests and ministers as their agents, they always said, "You will serve us or we will put you in jail, according to your activities."

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, all church activity was subjected and subjugated under an arm of the state?

Mr. DERABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And all church activities of the various denominations were coordinated by the state, and they were, also, sharply curtailed, were they not—the activities of the churches were cut down—they were prohibited from doing the things they had done before?

Mr. DERABIAN. No; they were never given permission, as you said. It was always, since 1931 or 1932, under state security and the Communist Party.

Mr. SOURWINE. At all times since 1931 or 1932?

Mr. DERABIAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Even during the so-called period of tolerance?

Mr. DERABIAN. This was just propaganda.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was just propaganda?

Mr. DERABIAN. That is right. Actually, General Karpov, being boss of the religious sections at the same time, was the head of the higher Communist Party school, which is under the central committee of the Soviet Communist Party. It was merely making a gesture about activities and how to make antireligious propaganda.

Mr. SOURWINE. As I understand it, or understand you to say, no one was allowed to be a priest or to participate substantially in religious activity unless he served the NKVD?

Mr. DERABIAN. I said so. Well, according to my experiences, I met some of these priests and bishops in the Soviet Union, sometimes when they were in Austria, and they were NKVD agents.

And I know exactly that all persons who were going into the seminary or attending the theological schools, before they go there, they were checked, all of them, and if it is possible, recruit all of them, because it happened like this—all of the people who like to join in the seminary or the theological institute, they write a report to the Council on Orthodox Affairs headed by General Karpov, who is on the Council of Ministers. General Karpov is the boss of the section and at the same time he gives orders as to the province sections, to check all of the people, and to include them and ask them to serve MGB.

Sometimes, as far as I know, from Karpov's section of security, they started at the theological schools and seminaries, and would spend a few years and become a priest and at the same time they were officers of state security.

Mr. SOURWINE. They remained officers of state security while they studied for the priesthood and actually after they became priests?

Mr. DERABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to be sure I understand this matter of the parallel organizations. You had many local branches of section O; is that right?

Mr. DERABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you, also, had General Karpov's Council on Orthodox Affairs?

Mr. DERABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which paralleled the organization of section O; is that right?

Mr. DERABIAN. Well, no; it is not exactly right. If you say Soviet Government, this is state security. Here is General Karpov under the Soviet Government, the Council of Ministers. He is boss of the Council on Orthodox Affairs. Here he is the top of the section.

Mr. SOURWINE. The same man?

Mr. DERABIAN. The same man.

Mr. SOURWINE. He wears two hats?

Mr. DERABIAN. That is right. Then he has a branch here in all of the provinces to coordinate activities. And he at the same time has branches, you see, how to stop religious activities.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. DERABIAN. In the same region.

Mr. SOURWINE. On one side as the active head of the church, the state church, he was promoting religion?

Mr. DERABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And on the other side he was inhibiting religion?

Mr. DERABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he do both jobs equally well?

Mr. DERABIAN. I would say so—well, they did not shoot him yet.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he a better inhibitor of religion than a promoter of religion?

Mr. DERIABIAN. I would say he is more for communism than—he works for the Communist Party, the central committee. Of course, it is impossible—it would not be correct if you say all of the bosses of these branches, you see, members of the state security—some of them, they are really just persons, but most of them are members of the Communist Party, and each section would like to know the kind of activities that is going on, to open the church. Here they get information to take measures to stop this thing. And then they will answer to the office what to do and how to do it, what kind of answer to give the believers.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, another point I think we should clear up for the record is this: You spoke of many of these priests and coreligious leaders being agents of MGB.

Mr. DERIABIAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. We do not confuse agents with regular members, do we—an agent is not the same thing as a member?

Mr. DERIABIAN. No; it is different. A member of the state security actually is an officer—

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a career job?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right. This is a steady job. An agent of the state takes on duty to get some information.

Mr. SOURWINE. I suppose not only to get information, but also to do small jobs?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. To carry stories back and forth?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. To maneuver things for the KGB?

Mr. DERIABIAN. You are right.

Mr. SOURWINE. As I understand it, the members are in accordance with the table of organization, they have a certain number, but the agents may be an indefinite number, is that right?

Mr. DERIABIAN. You are right. Sometimes more, sometimes less. It depends upon the religious activities. Yes, the number of agents, that number is flexible. It depends entirely on the strength of religious feelings and the activities in any one area. The net work is much greater if there is much of it. If there is little of it, then they do not need so many agents for that purpose.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did I understand you correctly to say that it was the objective to recruit as agents, if possible, all of these candidates for the priesthood?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You got as many as you could, and tried to get them all?

Mr. DERIABIAN. You are right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well now, suppose there was a young man studying for the priesthood and they could not recruit him. What happened? Was he allowed to go ahead and complete his studies and become a priest, or did they bring some kind of pressure to bear on him?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Well, if it happens like this, they will get some kind of information on him, or they will take his papers, and we will say that his course is filled up; and they will say, "We cannot take you."

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, if they could not recruit him, he never became a priest?

Mr. DERABIAN. You are right. Sometimes I would say that leaders, fanatics—they become priests—nothing to do for the government. Actually, they appointed them some kind in some small village. They are put there with KGB agent who is over him, taking care of him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do I understand you correctly as having said that it was the practice to lecture or brief the members of General Karpov's organization on antireligious activities?

Mr. DERABIAN. Yes, you are right.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was done periodically after regular intervals?

Mr. DERABIAN. I would not say regular periods. Actually, the KGB received that lecture from General Karpov maybe sometimes one, two, or three times a year. And sometimes the men of General Karpov's section went into the factory or the schools and the universities to make lectures, but there they represented themselves as members of some kind of party committee, in some kind of lay work, or as a lecturer in some part of the committee. Actually, he is a member of KGB, but he gave himself out as an instructor or lecturer from party committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever attend and listen to one of those briefings by members of Major General Karpov's organization?

Mr. DERABIAN. Yes, I did. I would say it was in 1947-48.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell us about it as you remember it?

Mr. DERABIAN. One was, I think in 1947. There was an increase in religious activity following the decision of the government to liberalize the government's policy for the church—reopening of the churches—because at that time, right after the war and during the war, there was an upsurge of growth of religious feeling and many people went back to church and began to go to church services. At that time, well, the committee was worried about that, about this growth, and they make some instructions about how to make religious propaganda, to give permission to the people to attend churches during the war and right after the war. And we have not to forget about our religious propaganda, because we are atheists as Communists.

I do not remember in particular what the name is. Most of the time the lecturer states that it was under the central committee instructions, sometimes under the order of the Ministry of MGB, and it was held to organize the operation—how to fit the religious activities inside of the community.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it clear to you at all times during this period that in spite of the open avowal of some relaxation of the repression on religion, they still regarded all religious activity as a threat to the Soviet state?

Mr. DERABIAN. Well, I will say that time when they opened the churches in 1944-45 it was clear for me that the Soviet Government was using the church to help fight the Germans, and to win the good will of the people for their own party.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was a part of the program of building a spirit of nationalism which would help?

Mr. DERABIAN. A program about nationalism and part of a program of the Communist Party at that time, because, well in that time

in the churches, most of the churches of the Soviet Union, yes, the main churches in the Soviet Union, actually, Stalin was noted as a leader—that is, in their services. This was during the war—long life for Stalin; long life for Stalin.

Mr. SOURWINE. This relaxation then was something dictated by the expediency of the party, rather than something forced by the emotions and will of the people?

Mr. DERIABIAN. You are correct; you are correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Deriabian, you spoke earlier of having known personally members of the religious organizations and the clergy who were MGB officers. Did you ever know of any cases where a person known to you to be an MGB officer appeared in the garb of a religious group, wore the clothing of a priest; for instance, a cassock?

Mr. DERIABIAN. In this question, well, I do not remember a name now, because it is very hard to remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not asking you to name persons. I am asking you if you knew there were persons at that time known to you to be MGB officers whom you saw in religious garb?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Yes, I knew some of them. Actually, I do not remember the year, but I met one who was, I think, in an MGB restaurant, inside of headquarters. That is the MGB headquarters at that time. I did not see him for 2 or 3 years, and then I met him in Moscow. He was wearing a priest habit, the cassock. I said, "What are you doing?"

He said, "Well now, I have served a few years as a priest."

I said, "How did you get that?"

He said, "Well,"—he didn't say it in so many words, but—"business is business. Do what you are told."

Mr. SOURWINE. Just another assignment?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right. Actually, he spent at least 2 years in the seminary, but before that he was working in the fifth directorate at that time. They call it that in section O.

Mr. SOURWINE. So it is just as we will send an Army officer to some civilian school to learn a special skill or to gain special knowledge?

Mr. DERIABIAN. You are right.

Mr. SOURWINE. To serve in a particular branch of the Army. In the Soviet Union they send MGB officers to the seminaries to become priests to serve a term as priests while they are still officers?

Mr. DERIABIAN. You are right. You are right.

I believe that he took money from MGB while he was a priest in the seminar.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mentioned that in 1953 you were sent to Vienna?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was your chief?

Mr. DERIABIAN. My chief at that time was Col. Evgeny Kovalev.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was his position?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Actually, he was the political adviser to the Ambassador.

Mr. SOURWINE. To which Ambassador?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Mr. Ilychev.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Ambassador to Austria?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Yes. He was actually—his position was political adviser to the Soviet Ambassador.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was just going to ask you if that was his true job—

Mr. DERIABIAN. It was his cover.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or whether his real job was something else?

Mr. DERIABIAN. His real job was chief of the Soviet Intelligence of the KGB in Vienna.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he was who?

Mr. DERIABIAN. And his real name is Kravtsov.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it be correct to say that he was the head of MGB in Vienna?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is correct. He was head of the Soviet intelligence.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was your own job there—your cover job?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Well, my cover job was—I was actually detailed to the Ambassador.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was your real job?

Mr. DERIABIAN. My real job was—I was Deputy Chief of Counter-intelligence of MGB, Soviet State Security in Vienna.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not sure that the record is quite clear as to the cover job of Kovalev. Tell us again, even at the risk of repetition.

Mr. DERIABIAN. Well, Kovalev was political adviser to the Ambassador. That was his cover job.

Mr. SOURWINE. He actually had a job in the Embassy; he was listed as a diplomat?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right, Mr. Kovalev.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was on the Embassy staff as the political adviser to the Ambassador?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And his MGB identity was not open—it was not known?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Not known.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, outside of the Embassy?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it known in the Embassy?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Well, I would say with 50 or 40 percent, knew that his MGB job was boss in Vienna.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he have any religious job also?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Yes, under the scheme he had agents who were working against the Zionists and religious activities in Austria.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, the Soviets worked against the Zionists and against the practitioners of the Jewish religion just as much as they do against the Christian religion?

Mr. DERIABIAN. You are right. Actually, those activities were under Colonel Gus'kov.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was under Kovalev?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Under Kovalev.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was his job—what was his cover job?

Mr. DERIABIAN. His cover job was, he was working in a section of the Embassy as a clerk.

Mr. SOURWINE. His real job was the coordination and repression of religious groups?

Mr. DERABIAN. Right. And under him was another agent whose name was Galitzin.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was his cover job?

Mr. DERABIAN. He was administrative officer of the Repatriation Commission of the Embassy.

Mr. SOURWINE. And his real job?

Mr. DERABIAN. His real job, he was working against Russian emigrés. I know his job was against the Orthodox religion in Vienna.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say he was working against Russian emigrants?

Mr. DERABIAN. Against Russian emigration.

Mr. SOURWINE. We would say escapees and refugees?

Mr. DERABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Another case of two hats. Under his cover job he was supposed to help these people.

Mr. DERABIAN. That is right; you are right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And in his real job he was working against them?

Mr. DERABIAN. You are right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have occasion to deal with Metropolitan Nikolai, the second ranking prelate of the Russian Orthodox Church?

Mr. DERABIAN. Yes, I did. In December 1953, Colonel Kovalev received and referred to me a telegram from Alexander Panyushkin—

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the same Panyushkin who was previously Ambassador to—

Mr. DERABIAN. To the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was his job at that time, that is, in December?

Mr. DERABIAN. At that time he was head, chief of state police in Moscow.

Mr. SOURWINE. How about this telegram; what was in it?

Mr. DERABIAN. That telegram was advising that there would be a delegation, a Soviet delegation to the so-called Conference for Peace that would arrive shortly in Vienna.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say the Soviet Conference for Peace—you mean the Vienna Peace Conference?

Mr. DERABIAN. The Vienna Peace Conference, you are right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. DERABIAN. And that Soviet delegation included Ilya Ehrenburg, a well-known Soviet writer, other writers, a noted Turkish author, and Metropolitan Nikolai, the archbishop. The telegram advised us to take care of the Turkish author, because it had information that the Turkish counterintelligence might kidnap or kill him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean the Turkish counterintelligence—

Mr. DERABIAN. Counterintelligence, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you going to kidnap him?

Mr. DERABIAN. Yes; that is right. At the same time the telegram said that Metropolitan Nikolai is an agent of KGB.

Mr. SOURWINE. The KGB?

Mr. DERABIAN. Well, at that time it was named the other.

Mr. SOURWINE. The NGB?

Mr. DERIABIAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. The telegram stated that Metropolitan Nikolai was an agent of State Security?

Mr. DERIABIAN. State Security.

Mr. SOURWINE. You saw this telegram?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Yes; I saw this.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was given to you in the course of your official duties?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

What else did the telegram say?

Mr. DERIABIAN. I read that telegram. And in accordance to that telegram I was going to take care of this Turkish author, and Metropolitan Nikolai; the telegram said that the Metropolitan Nikolai is an agent of the State Security. The telegram stated that he is a high-ranking archbishop in the Orthodox Church, and try not to make open to other people that he is the agent of the State Security, and to use this material only if necessary, and be very circumspect about the whole thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, do nothing to compromise his position?

Mr. DERIABIAN. You are right.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, go ahead. Did this telegram impose duties upon you—as a result of the telegram, were duties imposed upon you?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Well, the telegram told me to take care of all of the delegation and to meet them. Some of them arrived by train. Some of them arrived by plane. Actually, the Metropolitan Nikolai arrived by plane, and I met him in the airport and put him into my car with another member of the delegation—I do not remember the name now—and brought him to the Grand Hotel, Soviet headquarters in Vienna.

Mr. SOURWINE. You met the Metropolitan Nikolai then for the first time?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Then, actually, the first time.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you met his plane?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who introduced you?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Well, when he arrived in the airport, I introduced myself as a representative from the Soviet Embassy—"I am from the Ambassador to meet members of the Soviet delegation."

With me to meet Nikolai were some other members of the delegation—I do not remember now who. Another car was there. I took them to the Grand Hotel and I gave to the Metropolitan Nikolai a key to a room on the first floor, because during our trip, the Metropolitan Nikolai asked me who will give him a room, so I told him that I would give him everything, that I have the room.

He asked me for the first floor because of his age, he did not like to go upstairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. There are no elevators?

Mr. DERIABIAN. There were elevators, but he wanted the first floor.

Another thing, it was more convenient for him and for me; if I needed him, I could find him more easily than going to the other floors.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he know at that time that you were connected with the state police?

Mr. DERIABIN. No, at that time maybe he thought about this thing, but I did not mention to him anything. I told you what the telegram said to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not at that time introduce yourself as a member of the police?

Mr. DERIABIAN. No. I said, "I am an employee from the Embassy"; that is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, go ahead.

Mr. DERIABIAN. This evening, actually, when the Metropolitan Nikolai took the room, he asked me to find Father Arseny, a Russian Orthodox priest in Vienna. And in this case I went to see Colonel Gus'kov, to find information how I can find the father.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was Father Arseny?

Mr. DERIABIAN. He was a priest of the Orthodox Church in Vienna.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know why he wanted him?

Mr. DERIABIAN. The Metropolitan Nikolai felt, and told to me that he sent a telegram to Father Arseny to meet him at the airport and he did not know why Father Arseny did not meet him. I went and asked about the address of Father Arseny.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is interesting. You wanted to find a priest, so the easy way to find him was not to go to the church, but go to the man who was the head of the Zionist and religion section of the state police?

Mr. DERIABIAN. You are right.

Mr. SOURWINE. They had fingers on all of them?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Well they, of course, actually, they have a file on Father Arseny who was a state security agent, too.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was—Arseny was?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by "too"?

Mr. DERIABIAN. As I said before, Nikolai was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss this matter with Nikolai?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Actually, before I found Father Arseny, I asked Gus'kov where I could find him, and I told him that Nikolai, Metropolitan Nikolai arrived in Vienna and Gus'kov told me that the Metropolitan Nikolai and he were "brothers." Well, this is language—I mean, both of them—they are state security agents.

Mr. SOURWINE. Brothers?

Mr. DERIABIAN. He said, "Our brother."

Mr. SOURWINE. That is interesting, like the German Bundestag, SASA. Brothers means they were agents, as you defined it before the state police?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. DERIABIAN. Well, of course, it was just an expression.

Mr. SOURWINE. He knew what he was telling you and you knew what he was telling you?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right. You are right. Well, Gus'kov sent me to Galitzin to find Father Arseny, because the file on Father Arseny that he found in the files—

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you go to see Galitzin?

Mr. DERABIAN. I went to see Galitzin. And Galitzin told me that Father Arseny has been compromised and accused by MGB, an officer in 1953.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean by "compromised"—do you mean as we would say in slang, that they got "something" on him?

Mr. DERABIAN. That is right. You are right. Some kind of compromise on Father Arseny.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words they blackmailed him into becoming an agent for MGB?

Mr. DERABIAN. Well, it is possible—it is possible to say like this, using some kind of blackmail or something.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. Did they explain what this compromise was in Arseny's case?

Mr. DERABIAN. He told me that in 1942, during the German occupation, Father Arseny was in Russian territory in the Ukraine and made anti-Soviet propaganda, because he said that all believers would have to reopen churches, because the Bolsheviks closed the churches. He explained his feelings as anti-Soviet propaganda or anti-Soviet activity.

Mr. SOURWINE. By definition it was antistate propaganda?

Mr. DERABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. DERABIAN. And Galitzin showed me a newspaper which contained Father Arseny's article, what it was, and he said—

Mr. SOURWINE. By Father Arseny's article, you mean a newspaper story about the so-called anti-Soviet speeches?

Mr. DERABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. DERABIAN. And just what Galitzin said was that they were going to arrest Father Arseny, but the committee in Moscow turned it down, because to arrest him it would show they are against the priests, and it was not a good thing to do that. Galitzin said that the Metropolitan Nikolai one time sent to Arseny to invite him to Moscow for instruction, and Father Arseny did not go there, and started to sell his things, and so on and so on.

Through another agent, I do not know whom, Galitzin found out that Father Arseny was going to escape to Switzerland, because he was afraid that the police will arrest him. And second, they are going to recruit him. And the Metropolitan sent an order inviting him to Moscow, but he did not go because he knew if he went they would arrest him.

And using all of these things, Galitzin told me, in my connection with Metropolitan Nikolai, to ask him, to find more information about Father Arseny, whether he really was going to Switzerland, or to get the Metropolitan Nikolai to help us in our job, for him to become a state security agent, because before that Father Arseny told Galitzin that he would like to be friends—he would like to be friends with Galitzin, but he does not know how he could help the Government or representatives of the Soviet Embassy in his position.

And Galitzin told him that some of his friends who had some kind of connection with Austria, some of them working in American headquarters, and so on, maybe he will give some kind of information about them.

Actually, after talking with Galitzin I found that Father Arseny—I forget it now—I went to see him—and he opened the door and I asked him to visit me, that is to visit the Metropolitan Nikolai, at 8 o'clock in the evening on the first floor of the Grand Hotel.

He was so upset that he did not receive the telegram from him. I told him that Metropolitan Nikolai was upset because Father Arseny did not meet him.

He said he did not receive any telegram.

Well, anyway, I told him to be in the Grand Hotel at 8 o'clock. He asked me who I am. I told him I am just a member of the Soviet Embassy. He did not know I was an officer of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to be sure that I understand this. Father Arseny had been compromised by the possession of this newspaper article about his so-called antistate speeches?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And using this threat, pressure had been brought on him so as to recruit him as an agent?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. But even so, after having been recruited he was not serving as the organization thought he should?

Mr. DERIABIAN. You are right.

Mr. SOURWINE. So you took this up with Metropolitan Nikolai?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you take it up with him in the vein of telling him to do something about it or in the line of asking him what to do about it; in other words, did Metropolitan Nikolai himself have any decision to make in this instance?

Mr. DERIABIAN. After Metropolitan Nikolai met Father Arseny, I would say the next day, or 2 days, I invited Metropolitan Nikolai to my apartment for tea.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wait a minute. This was what time with relation to the meeting between Father Arseny and Metropolitan Nikolai at the Grand Hotel?

Mr. DERIABIAN. It was 8 o'clock in the evening, as I said before.

Mr. SOURWINE. They had a meeting at the Grand Hotel which you arranged?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long after that was the invitation you are now speaking of?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Well, I would say 1 or 2 days later.

Mr. SOURWINE. All about the same time; it was during the same visit?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Oh, yes, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. DERIABIAN. I invited Metropolitan Nikolai for a tea. And I introduced him to my wife and daughter, and at that time, while he was sitting in my apartment or hotel room, I started to talk to him about Father Arseny, and I told him we have some information that he is going to escape to Switzerland.

And I asked Metropolitan Nikolai what he knows about that or what he planned to do with him, or if he will ask him to Moscow or if he will stay in Vienna.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, this was in the posture where you were talking with Metropolitan Nikolai about a matter that he had to do something about, and you were asking him what he was going to do about it.

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. DERIABIAN. In this time I was not going to show him that I am a KGB agent, but I show myself—I did not tell him exactly, but I show myself that I have some kind of interest—I show him that I am KGB.

The next day Father Arseny again met Metropolitan Nikolai in the evening, I would say, maybe about 3 or 4 hours they were talking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before we go on there, what could Metropolitan Nikolai have done with this man—what could he have directed or ordered Father Arseny to do?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Well, actually, I felt at that time, according to my talk with Galitzin I was going to Metropolitan Nikolai, to say to him to find what he is going to do—what he is going to do with Father Arseny—if he will invite him to Moscow to find out if he will go there or not.

If he stays in Vienna we will see very well he will work for us, for MGB.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, you were not asking Metropolitan Nikolai to make a decision—you were just asking his opinion?

Mr. DERIABIAN. His opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a basis for a decision that would be made by the state police?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right, because I could not tell, according to my position—if I started to talk, what are you going to do, and so on and so on—I was going to put on pressure on Metropolitan Nikolai—I did not like to do that—according to the telegram.

Mr. SOURWINE. The actual situation was this, if I understand you correctly, here was a man who was the second highest in his church.

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were talking about orders as an ecclesiastic that he would give to his subordinates?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yet you were not asking him what he was going to do—you were just getting information from him?

Mr. DERIABIAN. You are right.

Mr. SOURWINE. He would later be told by the state police what to do?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. In his capacity as an ecclesiastic?

Mr. DERIABIAN. You are right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this the normal thing even in the intrachurch affairs that there is such close control by the state police?

Mr. DERIABIAN. I would say, take all churches—

Mr. SOURWINE. So that actually—

Mr. DERIABIAN. They were in control of all churches in the Soviet Union.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was not any special instance—it was simply the normal way of doing things?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You got the information from the ecclesiastic and then you decided what it was he was to do?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. DERIABIAN. Well, 2 days later when the peace conference in Vienna—

Mr. SOURWINE. You say "2 days later"—is this 2 days after your talk with Metropolitan Nikolai or 2 days after the second meeting between Metropolitan Nikolai and Father Arseny?

Mr. DERIABIAN. The meeting between Metropolitan Nikolai and Father Arseny.

Two days later when I was in the peace conference, actually it was in that conference in Vienna, I found the time and the place to speak privately with Metropolitan Nikolai, because the peace conference was going to close maybe the next day or 2 days—I asked Metropolitan Nikolai what his plan was for Father Arseny, and I asked Metropolitan Nikolai if he is afraid to go to Moscow. Metropolitan Nikolai replied that he was now sure that Father Arseny would not try to escape to Switzerland, "Because we are believers," he said. He said that he is the chief, just as I am the chief of my part, that he is the boss for his priests, and he believes that he will never escape to Switzerland, "So do not worry about that."

Mr. SOURWINE. The real situation here, was it not, that you had gone to Metropolitan Nikolai with a problem he had been told to do something about, and he was now reporting to you that he had done his job?

Mr. DERIABIAN. You are correct—you are right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Father Arseny was then to stay in Vienna, is that right?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Metropolitan Nikolai said that Father Arseny will stay in Vienna. He said nothing to worry about Father Arseny—just he was worried—Father Arseny was worried himself about his son. He just had one problem. Each father has his son.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this of significance that he was worried about his son?

Mr. DERIABIAN. You see, his son—Galitzin asked Father Arseny about the son. The son was in some kind of connection with some Americans, and he was an alcoholic. And it was not good for the father to have a son who is alcoholic and was arrested several times, and married twice, and a hooligan.

Mr. SOURWINE. His being connected with the Americans, did that have anything to do with his being married twice and being an alcoholic?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Another thing, when Galitzin talked to me, he said find what kind of connections his son had with Americans. Actually, maybe that son never has.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was part of the pressure that was being put on Father Arseny?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, go ahead.

Mr. DERIABIAN. Metropolitan Nikolai suggested that he hopes it is better to find another successor for religion on Galitzin, and he mentioned his name for me who had what he said is young and maybe

he does not understand well what he is doing—does not know how to walk and how to be a friend with priests and the like. He was asking me to help him to substitute for Galitzin some older man.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean a successor for Galitzin—you mean in all of his duties or only in his contact with Father Arseny?

Mr. DERABIAN. His contact with Father Arseny.

Mr. SOURWINE. He wanted another man to handle Father Arseny?

Mr. DERABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. In this confidential talk which you had that you are telling us about with Metropolitan Nikolai did you finally disclose that you were with the state police?

Mr. DERABIAN. Then I told him—I said to Metropolitan Nikolai that, "You know who I am."

He answered me that he knew—he recognized me, or knew me—he knew somewhat in higher or saw some time in higher reports.

Mr. SOURWINE. He knew then that you were with the state police?

Mr. DERABIAN. That is right. I did not ask how he recognized it—no question about that. And then I just told him that I received a telegram from Moscow, that I know about him, and I got orders from Moscow to help you here in Vienna.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew about him. You told him that you knew he was an agent?

Mr. DERABIAN. I did not tell him that he is an agent. I told him that I received a telegram from Moscow and I knew that he would arrive here. That Moscow told me.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I mean, you meant to convey to him indirectly that you knew he was an agent?

Mr. DERABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. He knew that is what you were conveying to him?

Mr. DERABIAN. That is right. He just asked me, but let us not talk about this. We did not talk any more. Of course, we knew each other.

After that, all of this talk, I gave a report to Colonel Kovalev, and I told Galitzin about my conversation with Metropolitan Nikolai, and I told him that the Metropolitan Nikolai said he said he was not worried about Father Arseny.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you tell him that Metropolitan Nikolai wanted another contact with Father Arseny?

Mr. DERABIAN. Well, I told to Kovalev in my report about this. I did not tell about this to Galitzin.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would have been out of channels—that was for Kovalev to tell him?

Mr. DERABIAN. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any further connection with Metropolitan Nikolai during the peace conference?

Mr. DERABIAN. During the peace conference, one time at a party which Metropolitan Nikolai asked me to organize, he invited Kovacic, Stryker, and Johnson—

Mr. SOURWINE. Dr. Hewlett Johnson?

The Red Dean of Canterbury—he invited him?

Mr. DERABIAN. Yes, he invited him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Metropolitan Nikolai invited him?

Mr. DERABIAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You arranged it?

Mr. DERIABIAN. I arranged it, the restaurant, and I ordered the dinner. And later on I was in my office and Metropolitan Nikolai called me on the phone and asked me to have some wine. First, I asked him if he needed it. Later on there were 18 bottles of Riesling.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many clergymen for the 18 bottles?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Well, actually, there were, I think, 20 or 22.

Mr. SOURWINE. Hardly a bottle apiece?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Well, actually, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where was this party?

Mr. DERIABIAN. It was in a restaurant on the Prater on the second floor—I do not know the name of the restaurant. There is one restaurant there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the pavilion of which they had a picture in Life magazine?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had met the Metropolitan Nikolai when he came in. Did you see him off—did you send him on his way?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Well, I told you that I saw him every day. Actually, I talked to him on the phone or knocked on the door and asked if he was ready to go to the conference—if he is ready, it was all right to go in my car. Sometimes we sent another car later. Sometimes he asked me about help to go to some tea in Vienna, or somewhere. I waited for him. Actually I took him to the airport when he was going back to Moscow. And in the airport he gave me an envelope which included what he said was about 700 or 800 shillings to give to Father Arseny.

Mr. SOURWINE. How much is that in American money?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Twenty-six shillings for \$1 dollar—approximately \$30, approximately.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. DERIABIAN. He asked me to see Father Arseny and to give this money to him, and asked me to say to Father Arseny that he did not have any time to see him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see Father Arseny again after that?

Mr. DERIABIAN. I went to Father Arseny's apartment. I saw him again and gave him this money from Metropolitan Nikolai. In his apartment I found some people—Father Arseny introduced me, and described a man as his best friend. Well, these men left in a little while. And I did not see any more of those men. I saw Father Arseny on the street or in the church.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you deliver to him the money?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Yes, I delivered him the money.

Mr. SOURWINE. That Metropolitan Nikolai gave you?

Mr. DERIABIAN. I gave him that money and said that Metropolitan Nikolai was sorry he could not meet with him—he said for me to give you an envelope with some money for you. Actually, the envelope was not sealed.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have in the record now several terms that probably should be defined for clarity—MGB, KGB, and NKVD. Will you place those in their proper perspective so that we will know what they mean?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Well, let me tell you this.

Before March of 1946, there were the People's Commissariat of the State Security. In March 1946—

Mr. SOURWINE. The People's Commissariat, is that the NKVD?

Mr. DERABIAN. Well, State Security—yes, and before 1943 there was the NKVD. Then it separated, with two ministers, the NKVD and the NKGB. And in March 1946, there was a big reorganization. And NKVD became MVD, and NKGB became MGB. Well, MGB, Ministers of State Security. From March 1940 until March 1953, there were two Ministries, well, MVD and MGB.

After the 5th of March, actually March 8, 1953, there was reorganization. They put MGB and MVD together; it was one Ministry, MVD in March 1943 and until March 1954.

And since March 1954, MVD and NKGB, was the Committee of the State Security.

Mr. SOURWINE. I wanted to get that clear for the record, so that anyone reading it would be able to follow it.

Mr. DERABIAN. And now they have MVD and KGB.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there anything more than you can tell us along the line that we have been discussing?

Mr. DERABIAN. I would like to say a few words about how the Communist Party controls religious activities inside of the Soviet Union.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. DERABIAN. In June 1937 and 1938, I worked in high school as a teacher, in an incomplete middle school, in the village of Savinovo. This was in Altai Kray, too.

During the above-mentioned period, in approximately August-September 1937, an order was received by the village Soviet of the village of Savinovo from the Rayon authorities of the Zonol'nogo Rayon Party committee of that region. That order was that the village party and Komsomol organizations were to open a club immediately, using the building of the local Orthodox Church for that purpose. And the priest of the above-mentioned Orthodox Church, whose name I do not remember, was arrested by the Soviet authorities in 1931 during the period of collectivization, and since then nothing was heard of him. The church was closed from the moment of the priest's arrest. And the church in Savinovo Village was closed in 1931, and it was in 1937, too.

The people—the believers—the people in that village wrote several letters to the Rayon executive committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. What does that mean?

Mr. DERABIAN. And asked them to give them priests and let them open the church—reopen the church again.

Mr. SOURWINE. The people petitioned to have their church reopened?

Mr. DERABIAN. That is right. And they did not receive any answer. Then wrote a letter to former President Michael Ivanovich Kalinin—at that time he was President of the U.S.S.R.—somebody gave them the idea that if they wrote to President Kalinin he will give them permission to reopen the church. Well, they wrote this letter to President Kalinin. Actually the letter returned to the district authorities, and that is the reason why the party committee of that district ordered Komsomol and the party members to immedi-

ately open the club, using the church, because the party district committee did not like the believers to reopen the church again.

Mr. SOURWINE. They took quite a chance when they petitioned at all, did they not, apart from reopening the church?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Actually, at that time it was, to write such kind of letter. The villagers sometimes were doing that. At that time the religious feeling was very strong in some of the localities, and it was impossible not to go along for a time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do the people of the Soviet Union have the right to petition for redress of grievances?

Mr. DERIABIAN. You see at that time, most of them, who was older women and men, they sometimes stayed around the church on holidays, talking with each other. It is their custom. They will go to the church. And then somebody gives them that idea—they wrote the petition—to sign that petition.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have been told that even to write and send a petition is almost a treasonable act.

Mr. DERIABIAN. Yes, you are right—you are right. And in this case, but I am telling you that sometimes it has happened, that people have wrote.

Mr. SOURWINE. They felt so strongly about getting their church back that they took a chance, in other words?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right. Well, at that time some people were arrested who signed this petition. I do not know if they were arrested in Savinovo or not. At that time, before they arrived there, before I arrived there to work as a teacher, I found what I will tell you now, that I was at that time a member of the commission—

Mr. SOURWINE. You were a member of this commission?

Mr. DERIABIAN. I was a member of that commission, because they appointed me to be a member, because I was Komsomol secretary of that village and I knew how, and therefore, being a member of that commission, and there were three or four others—I forget the name of a party member, another one was a young girl Komsomol, whose name was Yevdokiya Gonnykh, and me. The chief of the village Soviet gave us the key of the church. We went to the church and put down all the things which were inside of the church. Then we put them in a box, all of these things, and gave it to the chief of the village Soviet.

Mr. SOURWINE. These were the sacred objects of the church?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right, some ikons and some cloths and there was some silver.

Mr. SOURWINE. Altar cloths and the like?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And religious images?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Right. And we gave everything to the boss of that village Soviet who was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wait a minute. What did you give it to him for—was he going to keep it for the church or use it for the party or not?

Mr. DERIABIAN. I do not know what he did with those things. I know he put it in his basement in the village Soviet basement building. I do not know what he did with that.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, go ahead.

MR. DERIABIAN. At that time the Komsomol member, the Komsomol member of the party and another activist, opened the church, rather opened the club. Actually, we opened the club at that time.

MR. SOURWINE. Let me be sure I get that straight. Here was a group of old people, deeply religious, whose priest had been taken away from them?

MR. DERIABIAN. Right.

MR. SOURWINE. Their church closed for a year or so?

MR. DERIABIAN. Right.

MR. SOURWINE. In order to have a place to worship they petitioned to have the church reopened?

MR. DERIABIAN. Right.

MR. SOURWINE. What they got instead was to have the church stripped, all of the church property, the religious images, the altar cloths, the ikons, the censers were turned over to the party, and the church was converted into a youth club?

MR. DERIABIAN. Right.

MR. SOURWINE. So that they did not even then have a vacant church with some hope of turning it back to religious use—it was turned away from religious use completely, is that right?

MR. DERIABIAN. That is right, because the party committee of the district—you see, when they knew that the believers wrote the petition to the president and it was sent back to the district, they ordered the Komsomol and party members of that village, because they wrote again to the president, they opened the club. They will not have the right to open the church.

MR. SOURWINE. In other words, that was a clear case of cause and effect. They lost all hope of reopening the church because they asked to have it reopened?

MR. DERIABIAN. That is right.

MR. SOURWINE. Go ahead. Was that all of the story or is there some more?

MR. DERIABIAN. I think that is all of the story.

MR. SOURWINE. And you say these things are typical of Russia?

MR. DERIABIAN. This is typical.

MR. SOURWINE. That is, of the Soviet Union?

MR. DERIABIAN. Yes. Of course, when I was about 7 years old, just starting to go to school, we had a church in our village where I was born. That church was closed in 1929 during the collectivization, and our director of the school, who was a member of the Communist Party, or a member of Komsomol, I do not know now, he went to the church belfry. Well, the people were staying around the church and crying, the women and so on, and they did not reopen again. Just after a few months they opened it as a club. And after 2 years, as I remember now, they used that church building as a warehouse.

MR. SOURWINE. There is one thing I want to get clear. You told us of the policy of recruiting seminary students. And to use our slang phrase, "washing out" those who could not be recruited, so that all of the priests were agents. When did this begin? Over how long a period has this policy continued?

MR. DERIABIAN. I would say this began, I should say in 1936, 1937. I would say it began before, well, when the churches were closed and the priests were exiled—there were no priests left, but then when the

religious feelings persisted among the people and the authorities saw that they could not cope with this in any other way, then they adopted this particular tactic of getting in and recruiting the remaining ministers and priests. And that came about in 1936 or 1937.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that, for more than 20 years now, under the policy of the state police in the Soviet Union, to be a priest one has to be an agent?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that there are no priests who serve the church first—they are only agents of the state police serving as priests?

Mr. DERIABIAN. You are right. I would say this: Some of the priests who are serving as KGB agents believe in God, and they have to do it for police and God, because they could not—cannot find another way how to do it.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is a great contradiction here, is there not?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In order to serve the Soviet state police, they have to give allegiance first to the state, to the principles of the Soviet which include atheism?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So they have to pledge their allegiance to atheism before they can serve God?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right. Well, some priests there believe in God. There is no other way to do it. They have to serve the KGB.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean doing the best they can within the limitations of the state police?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. The state police own the churches, as you say.

Mr. DERIABIAN. You are right.

Mr. SOURWINE. In a sense, it owns the priests, too?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Some people in the state police, working there, even sometimes members of the state police, may not be wholeheartedly state police, but in fact are faithful to their own beliefs.

Mr. SOURWINE. By the same token, is it not true that the job of these agents in many instances is more than just atheism—it is, as a matter of fact, spying on their parishioners and exploiting them for the purposes of the state police?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Again you have a contradiction. Again, the priest is wearing two hats: In one he is leading his people and trying to help them, and in the other he is spying on them and controlling them and exploiting them for the state?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to turn to an entirely different matter just for a few moments before we close.

Did you read yesterday's newspaper stories about the kidnaping of a Soviet diplomat who was trying to defect in Rangoon?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Yes, I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. These newspaper stories reported that 40 guards took the man to the airport. Is this about the customary number of guards in a small Soviet embassy?

Mr. DERIABIAN. No, I would say these were members of the KGB.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would say the whole embassy staff was that?

Mr. DERIABIAN. That is right. Well, according to the order of the embassy; all of them went to the airport to save that man, actually save—

Mr. SOURWINE. Save in quotation marks?

Mr. DERIABIAN. In quotation marks, yes. Well, in my opinion I would say, as far as I know, KGB agents working in the Soviet embassy—I would say there would be 50 or 60 percent.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many would that be, in numbers, in a small embassy?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Well, if you say 40, I would say 20 or 30 of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the Embassy at Vienna with which you were familiar, how many were there?

Mr. DERIABIAN. Well, actually, in the Soviet high commission we had 400 people altogether; in state security, 76 officers, just state security, not including economic intelligence, and so forth—just state security, 76.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would the average Soviet embassy include what we would call strong-arm men?

Mr. DERIABIAN. I hesitate that they have that kind of man, even in Moscow—some of them will do this job on orders—they do not have that especially.

Mr. SOURWINE. I should like to submit a compilation of background material from various sources, regarding Metropolitan Nikolai, for inclusion in the record here.

Senator Dodd. It may be included.

(The above-described material follows:)

METROPOLITAN NIKOLAI (BORIS DOROFEEVICH YARUSHEVICH)

Metropolitan of Krutitsa and Kolomna

Born: 1892, Kovno.

Position: Member, Most Holy Synod, U.S.S.R. Russian Orthodox Church; Chairman, Department of External Church Affairs of Moscow Patriarchate.

Education: Doctor of theology.

BACKGROUND

1909—Entered physics and mathematics faculty, St. Petersburg University.

1910—Left university and entered Theological Academy, continuing as non-matriculated student in law faculty, St. Petersburg University.

1914—Defended candidate's dissertation at Theological Academy, remaining at Department of Canon Law in preparation for academic career; took monastic vows (Nikolai) and ordained regular priest; at beginning of war, was confessor to Finnish Bodyguard Regiment.

1915—Returned to Theological Academy to work on magister's dissertation and taught at Petrograd Theological Seminary.

1917—Defended magister's dissertation.

1918—Superior, Cathedral of Peter and Paul, Peterhof, now Petrodvorets.

1919—Archimandrite and Superior, Alexandr Nevsky Monastery.

1922—Elevated to Bishop of Peterhof and Vicar of Petrograd eparchy; opposed Renovated Church Movement in Russian Orthodox Church, for which he was arrested and exiled.

1924—Returned to Peterhof pulpit.

1927—Accepted declaration of deputy to patriarchal locum tenens Metropolitan Sergi on "unconditional loyalty to the Soviet power," and opposed Metropolitan Josef of Petrograd, who refused to accept the declaration and was subsequently shot.

1935—Elevated to archbishop.

1936—Administered Novgorod and Pskov eparchies.

1939—After annexation of western Ukraine and Byelorussia to Soviet Union was appointed exarch of these regions with title Archbishop of Volhynia and Lutsk; liquidated autocephalous aspirations of Ukrainian and Byelorussian Churches and subjected them to Moscow Patriarchate.

1941—Elevated to Metropolitan of Kiev and Galich with right to wear two special sacred ikons (panagiya) and have a cross carried before him at services.

1942—43—Edited "The Truth About Religion in Russia" and "The Russian Church and the Great Patriotic War" which describe freedom of religion in U.S.S.R., emphasize services of Russian Orthodox Church during war, and denounce enemies of Soviet regime.

1942—Member, "Extraordinary State Commission for the Establishment and Investigation of the Crimes of the Fascist Usurpers and their Accomplices," and in the name of the Russian Orthodox Church asserted the "innocence of the Soviet authorities" of the Katyn atrocities; "blessed the partisan feats" in his epistles to clergy and laity of occupied areas; opposed independence from Moscow Patriarchate of church in occupied areas; appealed for cessation of military acts against U.S.S.R. and for sabotage behind German lines; organized collection for formation of Dmitri Donskoi Tank Column; upon evacuation of patriarchal locum tenens to Ulyanovsk, administered affairs of Moscow patriarchate and eparchy.

1943—Was among three metropolitans received by Stalin.

1944—After death of Patriarch Sergi, became Metropolitan of Krutitsa, administrator of Moscow eparchy and patriarchal vicar.

1945—Participated in organization of the All-Russian Church Council and in the election of Patriarch of Moscow and All The Russias, Aleksii.

1945—Accompanied patriarch to Palestine and other countries to strengthen relations with Eastern patriarchs; visited England.

1946—Participated in All-Slavic Congress in Bulgaria.

1948—Participated in ceremonies installing Rumanian Patriarch Justinian.

1949—Elected member, Soviet Committee for Defense of Peace and the World Council for Peace; in name of Russian Orthodox Church denounced alleged American aggression and use of bacteriological weapons in Korea, and militaristic tendencies of Vatican.

1953—Laid wreath on Stalin's tomb and stood in his honor guard; participated in government receptions for foreign guests; frequent orator on public and church occasions; visited England.

1955—Visited Germany.

1956—Visited Norway. Visited the United States in June with seven other Russian Orthodox churchmen. He headed this delegation. He stayed in New York City and visited the United Nations, Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, Pa., Toledo, Ohio, (attended a meeting), and Greenwich, Conn., where he also attended a meeting.

Nikolai became second-ranking head of the Russian Orthodox Church in 1944 when he became Metropolitan from Krutitsa and Kolomna. He is Foreign Affairs Secretary of the Russian Orthodox Church, and as such Nikolai is the spokesman for the Russian Orthodox Church and for most of the reports coming out of Russia. When American churchmen go to Russia, they are usually received by Nikolai.

St. Nicholas Cathedral, 50 East 97th Street, New York, N.Y., is the Russian Orthodox Church affiliated with Moscow. There are no figures available of membership in St. Nicholas Cathedral.



* * * * *

¹ Hearings, Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, on Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States, Feb. 8, 1956, p. 2.

"Mr. RASTVOROV. As you know, the church in the Soviet Union is not independent, as, at the present time, the Soviet Union Government is trying to prove. It is completely dependent on the state, and the state conducts all activities of the church in the Soviet Union.

"Moreover, they not only conduct activities of the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union, penetrated by MVD agents * * *

Exhibit No. 226

(Excerpt from "Empire of Fear," by Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, pp. 97, 98. Vladimir Petrov was resident agent of MVD in Sydney, Australia, under cover of third secretary of the Soviet Embassy, and his wife was a cipher clerk when they defected, April 8, 1954, and asked political asylum from the Australian Government)

The overriding need for national unity in those desperate and critical days induced Stalin to bid for the positive support of even the religious leaders. With curious and characteristic cynicism he arranged a conference in the Kremlin, to which he invited the robed and bearded patriarchs and all the important dignitaries of the Russian Orthodox Church. At the conference there was also a certain Karpov. Now Karpov was a permanent career officer of the NKVD, who, over a long period, had made an assiduous and exhaustive study of Russian Orthodox ceremonies, ordinances, and theological teaching, and was able to converse earnestly and learnedly with the church dignitaries on their own ground. At this conference Stalin suggested that the character and the erudition of Karpov made him an ideal man to represent the church on the Soviet Council of Ministers. His suggestion was applauded, and Karpov was appointed.

I have seen Karpov. In 1951 he was Minister for Cults and Religious Affairs and may still hold that office. His NKVD training would be a valuable preparation for the post. After all, Stalin studied in a theological seminary.

"Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you personally, in your own experience as an NKVD officer, have any—were you ever assigned to do any work in infiltrating the Russian church?

"Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes; when I was in Japan the first time in 1946.

"Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us about it, and at this point, confine your testimony to your own personal experience in that particular episode?

"Mr. RASTVOROV. In 1946, the Soviet Government, through the MVD channels, tried to subordinate the group of Orthodox worshippers in Tokyo, which consists of White Russians and emigres. And for this purpose, the chief of the intelligence group—

"Mr. MORRIS. Would you repeat that, please? You say in Tokyo, in 1946, the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church in Japan were Russian emigres?

"Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes.

"Mr. MORRIS. All right.

"Mr. RASTVOROV. And after the death of Bishop Sergei, Nikolai Ono—

"Mr. MORRIS. Will you spell that, please?

"Mr. RASTVOROV. Nikolai Ono. * * *

* * * * *

"Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes. And at that time, the Government of the Soviet Union, using church for propaganda purposes and for intelligence purposes, did their best to send to Japan, from Moscow patriarchy, two Soviet priests as the head of this Orthodox Church in Japan. * * *

THE PATRIARCHATE JOURNALS; METROPOLITAN NICHOLAI

"Metropolitan Nikolai, Metropolitan of Krutitsky and Kolomna, the most important Metropolitanate in all Russia, is the second (if not indeed the first) most powerful hierarchy in the Moscow Patriarchate (1866-1870). His activities have been as Foreign Secretary for the Patriarchate" (Ex. H-D, p. 4).

(1) (Ex. 47-D, 5406-5411; Nikolai's "Words and Speeches," published by the Patriarchate, 1950, for official distribution in and out of Russia):

At "the All-Union Conference, in Moscow, of the Partisans of Peace," held in August 1949, Metropolitan Nikolai, as public spokesman for the Patriarchate, said (among other vilifying words):

* Hearings, Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, on Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States, Apr. 12, 1956, pp. 780-783.

"The greedy tentacles of the overseas octopus (the United States) strive to enmesh the whole globe. Capitalist America, that fornicatrix of the resurrected Babylon, having arranged a world market, attempts to seduce peoples, pushing them on to war. But the simple people of all countries draw away their eyes with repugnance from this shameless nakedness. * * *

"The overseas siren sings of 'freedom.' * * * Freedom to rob, to do violence, to kill—this is their 'freedom.'

"We shall not distribute arms to young men that they shall kill one another—screams the Washington Cain; and in these walls the frenzy of the rascal mingles with the desperation of a coward."

As if this outrageous tirade, so surely gratifying to the Kremlin, were not the utter limit for dastardly talk and the Big Lie, this "churchman" then proceeded to picture the United States as "the beast of Apocalypse" (5411).

The Patriarchate and the Kremlin attached such value to this abominable language that a year later the Patriarchate Journal of December, 1950, quoted and resanctioned it. (See Ex. 1-D, 4583.)

If Nicholai is not a Communist, he at least talked more like one than Stalin himself.

(2) (Ex. 1-D, 4608-4633, Patriarchate Journal, March 1951, issued during the Korean war):

At the "First Session of the World Council of Peace," held in East Berlin on February 23, 1951, Metropolitan Nicholai, again as public spokesman for the Patriarchate, made a major and extended address in which he said (among other grossly mendacious statements) (4611, 4612, 4621-4627):

"The great blasphemy, from the Christian point of view, is the fact that these people call themselves Christians. It does not fit into the bounds of reason and of conscience, how all these Trumans, Achesons, and Dulles, returning home from their offices, where they have just been bending over the maps of future devastation and murder, put on black frock coats and in the circle of their families read the Bible! * * *

"What do we see?

"Cynically violated standards not only of international rights, but of human morals. Executions without trial and inquisitions, secret and public. Dreadful tortures of victims: the cutting off of ears and noses, breasts, putting out of eyes, the breaking of arms and legs, the crucifixion of patriots, the burial alive in communal graves of women with children at their breasts, etc. The rebirth of the customs of savages—the scalping of Korean patriots for 'souvenirs'.

"For the purpose of annihilating the population, the American criminals first of all fanatically killed the political prisoners (from 200,000 to 400,000 persons), forcing them first to dig their own graves; they threw the bodies of patriots (who had been) hung, shot, or who died from typhus into a precipice and, to conceal the traces, blew up a cliff above it.

"These civilized savages arranged shooting matches with living targets, binding peasants to posts with barbed wire and shooting each of them over the heart of the target. Reviving the customs of the young-fascists, young-yankees photographed these scenes for their family albums and sent them home to their fiancés and wives.

"These representatives of the 'higher' race practised and practise mass rape of the women and young girls of Korea, rounding them up from surrounding towns, making them drunk on gin and raping them. Not limited to outrages, the miserable victims were driven, in places, into tunnels, shot by machineguns and buried under the debris of blown up cliffs.

"Often one can see on the roads of Korea the still warm corpse of a mother and a crying child at her breast. Cases are known when children, born in prison, were trampled by the soldiers' boots in front of the mother, and then the mother was killed."

The utterer of these foul words, and the Patriarchate in distributing them in America and throughout the world, could not but know that they were bribing the Kremlin with the desired false witness and with active contribution against our military defense of a free Korea.

(3) (Ex. 1-D, 4692-5, Patriarchate Journal, December 1951, published in the Korean war):

At the "Second Session of the World Council of Peace," Metropolitan Nicholai, again as public spokesman for the Patriarchate, denounced inclusively "the kindlers of war in Washington and London," and said (among other mendacities):

"Not for one day, in the countries of capital, does war propaganda stop. War hysteria in the U.S.A. has reached its apogee, there everything is directed to the service of war.

"The ideas of hatred of humanity are inoculated in children and young people on a broad scale in the U.S.A. And here is what such an education by cannibals leads to: * * *

"It is thus that the American kindlers of war try to raise murderers from their tender years."

(4) (Ex. 1-D, 4794, Patriarchate Journal, January 1953) :

In a major speech at "the Congress of Peoples for the Defence of Peace in Vienna," Metropolitan Nikolai, again as public spokesman for the Patriarchate, said (among other contributions to the cold war on the United States) :

"It is necessary to demand daily the prohibition of atomic and bacteriological weapons and cessation of military actions in Korea, Vietnam, and Malaya.

"It is necessary to renounce firmly to be direct or indirect participants as well as victims of lawlessness the needs of which, as it is known, are horrible and disgusting. Annihilation of the Korean people. Spreading of epidemics. Destruction of fruits of human labor and people's culture. Economic bondage, causing poverty and unemployment. * * * Such are the deeds of lawness!"³

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no further questions.

Senator DODD. The hearing will stand adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 5 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.)

³ Brief filed for plaintiff-appellant, *Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church of North America v. Wassil A. Kreshik, Dean of Saint Nicholas Cathedral, etc.*, Court of Appeals of the State of New York, pp. 31-35.

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Officer of the NKVD, later known as the Ministry of State Security.	
Rank of major of state security.	
Case officer in naval counterintelligence.	
Chief of Komosomol, Communist youth organization in Moscow in 1945-46.	
Officer of Austro-German section as deputy chief of German sector, 1952.	

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